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Is policy representation in contemporary Westminster systems solely a function
of programmatic national parties, or does the election of legislators via single-member
districts result in MPs whose policy positions are individually responsive to public opin-
ion in their constituencies? We generate new measures of constituency opinion in
Britain and show that, in three different policy domains and controlling for MP party,
the observed legislative behavior of MPs is indeed responsive to constituency opinion.
The level of responsiveness is moderate, but our results do suggest a constituency-MP
policy bond that operates in addition to the well-known bond between voters and
parties.
Introduction
For countries that elect their legislators using single-member dis-
tricts (SMDs), one fundamental form of substantive representation
(Pitkin 1967, 222–24) is the degree to which the policy positions of legis-
lators reﬂect the policy preferences of their constituents—a form of
representation that has become known as dyadic representation
(Weissberg 1978, 536). To the extent that SMD elections are contested
by “responsible” (Katz and Wildenmann 1987, 7)—i.e, cohesive and
programmatic—national parties, some degree of dyadic representation is
guaranteed: If each constituency chooses between candidates based on
their party’s programme, and each legislator faithfully supports their
party’s programme, this by itself will lead to an association between con-
stituency opinion and legislator policy position (Ansolabehere, Snyder
and Stewart 2001; Miller and Stokes 1963). But does the electoral link-
age between individual legislators and their constituents created by
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SMDs also result in within-party policy responsiveness, whereby the
policy positions of individual legislators within the same party co-vary
with opinion in their particular constituencies?1
In the United States, where the vast majority of research on dyadic
representation has been conducted, the answer appears to be a qualiﬁed yes
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Clinton 2006, 401; Kastellec,
Lax and Phillips 2010; Krimmel, Lax and Phillips 2016). Yet outside
of the United States research on dyadic representation is much less
developed (Powell 2004, 283–84). Indeed, with some rare exceptions
(Converse and Pierce, 1986), scholars have yet to empirically demon-
strate the existence of dyadic representation in many countries that
have SMD electoral systems, much less establish whether any dyadic
representation that does emerge is entirely due to responsible national
parties or at least in part due to within-party policy responsiveness.
This is unfortunate because the United States is somewhat unusual
among SMD systems, with its relatively weak party cohesion and more
individualistic electoral competition (Bawn and Thies 2003; Carey and
Shugart 1995; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011), making it an envi-
ronment particularly conducive to within-party policy responsiveness.
Westminster systems appear to present a far more challenging
environment for within-party policy responsiveness, characterized as
they are by parliamentary government with strong executive agenda-
setting powers, resulting in highly disciplined parties that compete
electorally on national policy platforms (Bawn and Thies 2003; Cox
1987). Focusing on the United Kingdom as a case study, this article asks
whether party dominance completely precludes within-party policy
responsiveness in a Westminster system, or whether, even accounting
for party, there remains some association between the policy positions
of individual Members of Parliament and policy opinion in the
constituencies they represent.
While we are not be able to establish a causal mechanism here,
even establishing the descriptive fact that such an association exists
speaks to important normative and practical debates about the merits of
Westminster systems. This is because the “strong voter-member link-
ages” purportedly fostered by SMDs in Westminster systems are
commonly highlighted by opponents of electoral reform as one of the
main reasons why the well-acknowledged costs of SMD elections—
chieﬂy, high levels of disproportionality (Carey and Hix 2011)—are
worth bearing (Norris 2001, 877).2 Studies have documented evidence
that such voter-member linkages are manifest with respect to MPs’ non-
policy, constituency service-type behaviors (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina
1987; Norton and Wood 1993; Rush 2001; Searing 1994) and with
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respect to the policy issues that MPs choose to attend to (Blidook and
Kerby 2011; Soroka, Penner, and Blidook, 2009). However, research on
voter-member linkages with respect to policy positions has to date been
impeded by a lack of the required empirical measures.
Establishing the existence of within-party policy responsiveness
would also point toward a previously underappreciated channel for poli-
cy representation in Westminster systems. Kam et al. (2010) have
provided evidence that the policy positions of backbench MPs in the
Commons signiﬁcantly constrain party leaders, the actors assumed to
dominate the policymaking process in Westminster systems. They spec-
ulate (301) that this inﬂuence of rank-and-ﬁle MPs could mean that
nonmarginal constituencies have more inﬂuence in the policymaking
process than previously thought (Kam et al. 2010, 201). Of course, this
only holds if it can be shown that, within a party, MPs’ policy positions
reﬂect those of their constituents.
There are two main reasons why it has previously been so difﬁcult
to directly test for within-party policy responsiveness. First, it is expen-
sive to obtain accurate estimates of constituency policy opinion through
mass surveys. Although the per-respondent cost of opinion surveys has
decreased over time, sampling even a small number of respondents in
each of the 632 constituencies in mainland Britain quickly yields total
sample sizes in the hundreds of thousands. Second, it is difﬁcult to mea-
sure individual legislators’ policy positions. The British Representation
Study (e.g., Norris and Lovenduski 1992, 1997, 2001) has surveyed pro-
spective parliamentary candidates at many recent general elections and
asked them to indicate their position on different policy dimensions;
however, these measures suffer from low response rates (Kam et al.
2010) and cannot be linked to particular constituencies because they are
always collected on the condition that “individual replies will be treated
in the strictest conﬁdence” (Kam et al. 2010, xx). Strong party discipline
also means that differences of opinion between members of the same
party are often reconciled privately (Cowley 2002, 183; Norton 1999),
or, if they are made visible in legislative votes, are only done so in ways
incompatible with the models of sincere voting upon which many scal-
ing techniques rely (Spirling andMcLean 2007).
In this article, we capitalize on recent methodological advances to
overcome these two difﬁculties. We use methods of small-area estima-
tion to generate estimates of constituency opinion both on a general left-
right economic scale and on speciﬁc issues (same-sex marriage and the
European Union). We then show how variation in constituency opinion
is associated with within-party variation in MP positions as revealed by
scaled Early Day Motion signatures (“unobtrusive measures” of
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backbench policy positions [Franklin and Tappin 1977]), votes of
conscience, unwhipped votes, and whipped votes. Finally, we lay out an
agenda for future research into the possible causes of within-party policy
responsiveness in aWestminster system.
Dyadic Representation in Comparative Perspective
Most existing empirical studies of dyadic representation focus on
the United States. In their seminal article, Miller and Stokes (1963)
examine the House of Representatives and ﬁnd that legislator respon-
siveness to constituency opinion varies across policy dimensions,
although subsequent analyses of their data suggest that responsiveness is
less variable across policy dimensions (Achen 1978) and generally great-
er in magnitude (Erikson 1978) than they originally concluded. More
recently, scholars have utilized innovative joint-scaling techniques to
measure legislator and constituency positions on the same metric
(Bafumi and Herron 2010; Masket and Noel 2012), concluding that leg-
islator positions are often extreme compared to the median voter in their
constituency. Of most relevance for this article are those US studies that
distinguish between dyadic representation due to responsible national
parties and that due to within-party policy responsiveness (Ansolabe-
here, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Clinton 2006; Kastellec, Lax, and
Phillips 2010; Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips 2016; Masket and Noel
2012). While these studies do yield evidence of within-party responsive-
ness—Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), Clinton (2006, 401),
Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2010), and Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips
(2016) all ﬁnd a clear positive association between legislator positions
and constituency opinion for legislators from the same party—they also
demonstrate that partisan factors remain of considerable importance to
the representational process.
When we consider this US-focused literature from a comparative
perspective, we are forced to conclude that the prospects for within-party
policy responsiveness in other countries with SMD elections are
unpromising. Within-party policy responsiveness is likely to be a prod-
uct of electoral selection (each constituency electing a legislator whose
preferences are aligned with its own) or electoral sanction (each legisla-
tor following what they perceive to be the will of their constituency to
increase their re-election chances) or both (Miller and Stokes, 1963). It
should therefore be at its strongest when electoral contests depend more
on the personal attributes of individual legislative candidates, as in the
United States, and weaker when electoral contests depend more on their
party afﬁliation, as is the case in many other SMD systems (Bawn and
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Thies 2003; Carey and Shugart 1995; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister
2011).
Yet at present, we simply lack evidence as to whether or not this
expectation is borne out because there is a paucity of empirical research
on dyadic representation outside of the United States. The main excep-
tion is Converse and Pierce’s (1986) study of the French Fifth Republic.
They ﬁnd that the roll-call voting of French deputies, elected from
SMDs via a two-round run-off system, is responsive to constituency
opinion. However, they do not establish whether this responsiveness has
a within-party component, or whether it emerges solely due to partisan
competition.
We contribute by testing for within-party responsiveness to constit-
uency opinion in the UK House of Commons. Of all countries with
SMD legislative elections, those withWestminster systems like the Unit-
ed Kingdom are where the selection and sanctioning mechanisms apt to
produce within-party responsiveness are arguably at their weakest. In
Carey and Shugart’s (1995) ranking of electoral systems according to
incentives to cultivate a personal vote, the system used in the United
Kingdom is ranked lowest of all SMD systems, with only closed-list PR
systems generating weaker incentives for a personal vote. Compounding
this, the agenda-setting power of the executive in a Westminster system
means that voters tend to think of elections more as an opportunity to
choose a national party for government rather than an opportunity to
choose an individual to represent them in parliament (Bawn and Thies
2003; Cox 1987).
Still, there are reasons to believe that even in a Westminster system
like the British one, some within-party responsiveness to constituency
policy opinion may emerge. Although British election campaigns are
primarily focused on national parties, they have in recent decades
become more localized (Johnston and Pattie 2014). At the same time,
the partisan and class-based attachments of the British electorate have
declined (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009). Both of these developments offer
scope for some electoral connection between individual MPs and their
constituents. Indeed, British MPs believe that there is an electorally con-
sequential “personal vote” that derives from their actions as individual
representatives and that can offer some defense against ﬂuctuations in
the electoral popularity of their party (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987).
Although apolitical constituency service activities are viewed as the
most efﬁcient means of attracting such a vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fior-
ina 1987; Norton and Wood 1993), an MP can also attract extra votes
through legislative activities (Kam 2009), and there is even voter-level
evidence that voters hold MPs partially accountable for their Commons
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voting record (Vivyan and Wagner 2012). In other words, British MPs
interested in re-election have at least some incentive to adopt policy posi-
tions amenable to their local constituencies. These incentives may not be
large, and may not alter the position of the United Kingdom within Car-
ey and Shugart’s (1995) classiﬁcation of the incentives to cultivate a
personal vote, but they are not zero.
In addition to these ex post electoral sanctioning mechanisms, ex
ante selection mechanisms may also play a role in Britain. First, recent
research ﬁnds that British voters are more likely to support parliamentary
candidates who live closer to them (Arzheimer and Evans 2012). If can-
didates with more local links are more likely to share the political views
of their constituents, then voters’ propensity to favor these local candi-
dates would lead to the election of MPs whose preferences are better
aligned with those of their constituents. Second, Buttice and Milazzo
(2011) show that local party organizations in safe British seats tend to
select more ideologically extreme parliamentary candidates, while those
in more marginal seats—acting strategically—tend to select more mod-
erate candidates. To the extent that constituency marginality correlates
with constituency ideological moderation, this behavior on the part of
local parties has the effect of increasing the chances that moderate con-
stituencies elect moderate MPs (from whichever party) and that more
extreme constituencies elect more extremeMPs.
Do these selection and sanctioning mechanisms combine to yield
within-party responsiveness to constituency opinion in the British sys-
tem? The literature on what might be termed the “constituency role” of
legislators in Westminster systems provides some circumstantial evi-
dence. There is general agreement that in the United Kingdom this role—
which involves “looking after the collective and individual interests of
those they represent” (Rush 2001, 22) or “acting as agent to protect and
advance the interests of ordinary citizens” (Searing 1994, 122)—has
increased over time (Norton 1994, 1999); is increasingly regarded by
MPs as their most important role (Campbell and Lovenduski 2014;
Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2004; Rush 2001, 216–17); and is also
regarded by constituents as the role that ought to be most important for
MPs (Campbell and Lovenduski 2014). The problem is that this broad
notion of a “constituency role” can cover nonpolicy constituency service
activities and does not necessarily imply policy responsiveness in the
sense deﬁned above. Indeed, one investigation of MPs’ roles found that
although MPs regarded their constituency role as their most important, in
“deciding how to act and vote in Parliament,” MPs said that they were
more strongly inﬂuenced by the “advice of . . . party leadership” and
“personal opinion” than “constituency opinion” (Rush 2001, 218).
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There has been some recent research that examines more explicitly
the link between the policy positions of MPs and policy opinion in their
respective constituencies. But this relies without exception on proxies
for constituency opinion, which both obscures the difference between
interests and preferences, and elides many other unobserved constituency
characteristics. For example, Hibbing and Marsh (1987) and Baughman
(2004) both use the religious composition of constituencies—speciﬁcally,
the percentage of Roman Catholics—to explain MPs’ free votes on abor-
tion and homosexuality. In Canada, Soroka, Penner, and Blidook (2009)
used the presence of a military base in a constituency to explain the rate
at which MPs asked questions about defense policy at Question Period;
Blidook and Kerby (2011) extended this logic to a range of demographic
constituency covariates.
The lack of good measures of constituency opinion has inhibited
research on dyadic representation and within-party policy responsive-
ness in Westminster systems—but this literature is also limited because
there is little variation in parliamentary outcomes to explain. Levels of
legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems in general are high com-
pared to the United States, and levels of party unity in Westminster
systems, including the United Kingdom, are higher still (Carey 2007).
The strong pressure exerted by party whips means that votes do not
reveal differences in ideology, but rather differences in levels of govern-
ment support (Spirling and McLean 2007). Consequently, research into
dyadic representation in the Commons must solve these twin problems.
Measuring Constituency Opinion
To examine whether MPs are responsive to constituency opinion,
we need measures of constituency opinion. In the past, the difﬁculty of
obtaining such measures has limited research on dyadic representation:
If opinion in a given constituency can only be elicited through a survey
of a moderately large representative sample of the population of that con-
stituency, then the cost of eliciting opinion across all constituencies
quickly becomes prohibitive. Here, we overcome this problem by using
“multilevel regression and post-stratiﬁcation” (MRP), a technique for
estimating opinion within small areas using large national survey
samples in conjunction with auxiliary information about the small area
characteristics (Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016; Lax and Phillips
2009; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004; Selb and Munzert 2011;
Warshaw and Rodden 2012).
The MRP strategy we employ to estimate opinion in UK par-
liamentary constituencies begins with data from a reasonably large
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national survey sample measuring respondents’ constituency location,
demographic characteristics, and opinion on the topic of interest. Disag-
gregating this national survey sample by constituency yields 632
constituency subsamples. Although these subsamples do provide us with
some information, we cannot rely on them alone to estimate constituency
opinion because the subsamples are small—disaggregating even a large
national survey sample of 10,000 respondents would leave less than 20
respondents per constituency. Instead, we use MRP to supplement these
constituency subsamples with four types of additional information.
First, we supplement each constituency subsample with informa-
tion from the wider national survey sample, estimating a multilevel
model of respondent opinion with constituency random effects. This
“global smoothing” shrinks estimates based on constituency subsamples
alone toward the national sample average.
Second, we add to the multilevel regression constituency-level pre-
dictors for the constituency random effects. To the extent that these
constituency-level variables are associated with respondent opinion,
our estimate for a given constituency is smoothed more toward average
opinion among respondents from all constituencies with similar charac-
teristics (Gelman and Hill 2007, 269). Since we have a large number of
constituencies, we were able to include a broad set of constituency-level
predictors in our MRP models with the aim of explaining as much varia-
tion in opinion as possible.3 The constituency-level characteristics we
include are: logged population density; percent nonwhite residents;
logged median earnings; religious composition (Christian, non-Christian,
or refused to answer census religion question); percent female; mean age;
median education level; percent married; percent homeowners; median
social grade; percent working in private sector; government ofﬁce region;
and the vote shares of the three main national parties (Conservative,
Labour, Liberal Democrat) in the constituency at the preceding (2010)
general election.4 Further details on the source for these predictors can be
found in Appendix C of the online supporting information.
Third, we incorporate respondent demographic characteristics as
individual-level predictors in the multilevel regression model of opinion
and then poststratify to the distribution of these demographic characteris-
tics in each constituency population. Thus, our estimates of opinion for a
given constituency incorporate information about average opinion
among all survey respondents with a particular combination of demo-
graphic characteristics, and about how many individuals of this
demographic “type” live in the constituency. This aspect of MRP yields
greater gains the better individual opinion is explained by individual
demographic characteristics and the more demographic composition
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varies across constituencies. It also acts as a form of survey weighting,
yielding constituency opinion estimates that are adjusted to account for
differences between the survey sample and constituency population
characteristics. We include a number of individual-level demographic
predictors in our MRP models: gender; agegroup; highest educational
qualiﬁcation; marital status; social grade; home ownership; and private-
sector occupation. Full details on these measures can be found in Appen-
dix C of the supporting information, but it should be noted here that the
ﬁnal two predictors were not included in the MRP model for same-sex
marriage because these were not measured in the survey data we use to
estimate opinion on same-sex marriage.
Fourth, we incorporate geographic information by including spa-
tially correlated constituency random effects in our multilevel regression
model of opinion. Thus, our estimates of opinion in a given constituency
are smoothed toward average opinion among respondents in nearby
constituencies.
All of these different sources of information can be combined, and
validation evidence shows that their combination results in the best pos-
sible estimates of UK constituency opinion (Hanretty, Lauderdale, and
Vivyan 2016). The estimates of constituency opinion used here are thus
based on poststratiﬁed predictions from multilevel regression models
including individual and constituency-level predictors together with spa-
tially correlated random effects. We adopt a Bayesian approach to the
estimation of these models, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods. Appendix C in the supporting information provides further
technical details.
Dyadic Representation across Four Studies
Having described a general technique for estimating opinion in
British constituencies, we turn to assess the association between constit-
uency opinion and MP policy positions. However, we cannot measure
the latter simply by scaling all recorded votes in the Commons. Levels
of party cohesion are extremely high in Commons divisions (Carey
2007), with most intraparty disagreements either resolved via private
negotiation between party leaders and backbenchers (Cowley 2002, 183;
Norton 1999) or suppressed via the whip and an accompanying threat of
sanctions for disloyalty (Kam 2009). Thus standard approaches for the
scaling of roll-call votes tend to reveal not the policy position of MPs,
but rather their level of government support (Spirling and McLean
2007).
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To test for within-party responsiveness to constituency opinion,
we must instead analyze more speciﬁc instances where there is observ-
able variation in the behavior of MPs from the same party and where the
policy positions implied by MP behavior are clearly discernible. In each
case, we can then examine whether the variation in MP positions on
a given policy dimension is associated with variation in constituency
opinion on the same dimension.
We present evidence from four case studies. In the ﬁrst three, we
focus on instances where MP behavior is not governed by party whips.
Study 1 investigates the link between constituencies’ left-right position
and MPs’ left-right positions as revealed through their signatures on Ear-
ly Day Motions (EDMs). EDMs are unwhipped, and have been
suggested as unobtrusive measures of backbench opinion. Studies 2 and
3 investigate the link between constituency opinion and MP behavior in
free votes on same-sex marriage and the European Union, respectively
(with the latter restricted to Conservative MPs only). These free,
unwhipped votes took place in 2013, and are the only free votes between
2010 and 2015 for which there is sufﬁcient public opinion data to
generate corresponding constituency opinion estimates.
Finally, because we are also interested in MP responsiveness to
constituency opinion when party discipline is present, in Study 4 we
investigate the link between constituency opinion on the European
Union (EU) and the rate at which Conservative MPs voted against their
party whip (“rebelled”) in EU-related parliamentary votes held between
2010 and 2014. A focus on the rebelliousness of Conservative MPs in
EU-related divisions has two key advantages compared to analyzing
whipped votes on other topics. First, the policy content of MP behavior
is clear in this case: when Conservative MPs rebelled on Europe, they
were adopting a stance that was more anti-European—“Eurosceptic”—
than that of their party leadership. Second, due to the government’s rela-
tive lack of agenda control over the European issue,5 Europe-related
votes occurred frequently during the 2010 parliament. Because we
observe Conservative MPs’ willingness to rebel on Europe on multiple
occasions, this enhances our ability to discriminate between them in
terms of their expressed level of Euroscepticism.
We discuss each case study in turn.
Study 1: Economic Aspects of the Left-Right Cleavage
MP behavior. EDMs—“formal motions submitted for debate in
the Commons . . . which allow MPs to draw attention to an event or
cause”6—are “unobtrusive” measures of backbench policy positions
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(Franklin and Tappin 1977). Any MP can sponsor or cosign an EDM
(though in practice it is mainly backbench MPs who do so). EDMs are
not whipped, are unlikely to result in a formal debate, and have limited
consequences for policy or the use of parliamentary time. Some EDMs
are trivial, but many concern important matters relating to taxation,
spending priorities, social services, and other issues closely related to the
left-right dimension in British politics. This means that cosigning EDMs
on economic policy can be taken to indicate agreement on a policy posi-
tion. However, because EDMs are circulated to members informally,
and have limited consequence, failure to sign is not necessarily an
indication of policy disagreement.
Kellermann (2012) has suggested that EDMs can be used to esti-
mate policy positions as long as the general propensity of MPs to sign
EDMs is estimated at the same time. Some MPs will have a high
“signing cost,” and will rarely sign EDMs, even those with which they
agree. Some MPs will have a low signing cost, and will more frequently
sign EDMs. The lower the signing cost, the more the absence of a signa-
ture can be interpreted as if it were disagreement with the policy position
expressed by the motion.
We follow Kellermann (2012) in modeling signatures on EDMs as
a function of legislators’ policy positions and their signing costs. We dif-
fer from Kellermann in the functional form we use, which is closer to
standard models used for the analysis of roll-call data (Clinton, Jackman,
and Rivers 2004). The details of this model and its estimation can be
found in Appendix A of the supporting information.
Our EDM data comes from the 2010–12 Parliamentary session. We
began by excluding “prayers” (early day motions tabled by the Opposi-
tion leadership against statutory instruments being introduced by the
government) and Early DayMotions that were geographically speciﬁc.7
We then deﬁned a list of key terms relating to the economic left-
right dimension, and we dropped from our sample any EDM that does
not contain at least one of these terms.
Speciﬁcally, we searched the text of each EDM for any of the fol-
lowing words or word stems: tax, deﬁcit, budget, spend, services,
welfare, income, expenditure, debt, trade, econom*. This leaves us with
902 motions, from which we were able to estimate positions for 419
MPs, of whom all but 10 were members of the three largest parties (Con-
servatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats), and most of whom were
backbenchers throughout the session.
Constituency preferences. We measure the economic left-right
position of constituents by combining information from multiple survey
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items included in two British Election Study (BES) surveys: the post-
election wave of the 2010 Campaign Internet Panel Survey (CIPS, May
7–24, 2010) (Clarke et al. 2014); and the postreferendum wave of the
Alternative Vote Referendum Survey (AVRS, May 6–25, 2011) (Clarke
et al. 2011), which contains responses from a large number of the origi-
nal CIPS respondents. Across the CIPS and AVRS surveys, we
identiﬁed nine economic-policy-related items. These items generally
asked respondents to say how much they agreed with or approved of
proposed or actual policy measures, such as a “mansion tax” on proper-
ties worth over £2 million, increases in university tuition fees, and cuts
in government spending. The nine policy items are detailed in Appendix
B of the supporting information.
Overall, we observe data on 10,821 individuals who responded to
both the CIPS post-election wave and the AVRS postreferendum wave.
Based on their answers to the nine economic-policy-related items, we
estimate an ordinal item-response theory (IRT) model (the details of this
model are reported in Appendix B of the supporting information). This
yields an estimate of each respondent’s position on a continuous under-
lying left-right economic dimension. These respondent economic left-
right scores were then modeled using the MRP method discussed in the
previous section to create a measure of constituency left-right opinion.
The relative positions of constituencies have good face validity.
The ﬁve most left-wing constituencies—Glasgow North East, Liverpool
Riverside, Glasgow East, Glasgow South West, and Knowsley—are all
urban in character and located in current or former Labour heartlands.
The housing estates of Glasgow North East are, to some extent, the lega-
cy of “Red Clydeside,” the militant socialism of the West of Scotland
betweenWorld War I and the 1930s (McLean 1983, 234–35). Liverpool
Riverside shares a legacy of interwar militancy, but the city continued to
support militant socialism (and the militant tendency) within the Labour
Party as recently as the 1980s (Crick 1986, 35–49). Conversely, the ﬁve
most right-wing constituencies (Orpington, Maldon, Rayleigh, and
Wickford, Ruislip Northwood and Pinner, and Surrey Heath) have often
been held up as metonyms for a “neat suburban prosperity” (Horne
1989, 335).
Findings. Table 1 shows the results of six OLS regressions of
MPs’ left-right economic positions as measured by their EDM signing
behavior.8
The ﬁrst three regressions are estimated for all MPs from the three
main parties (Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats) for whom we
have estimated positions. We model positions as a function of (1)
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constituency left-right economic position alone (scaled to have a mean
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1); (2) MP party afﬁliation; and (3) both
party afﬁliation and constituency opinion. The ﬁnal three regressions
subset the MPs by party afﬁliation and model positions as a function of
constituency opinion alone.
Table 1 shows signiﬁcant associations between constituency opin-
ion and MP EDM signing behavior concerning left-right economic
issues. The coefﬁcient on constituency opinion is positive and signiﬁcant
when included as the only predictor of MP position (1). Once MP party
is controlled for (3), the estimated coefﬁcient drops substantially in terms
of magnitude but retains signiﬁcance. The coefﬁcient estimates in the
party-speciﬁc regressions (4, 5, and 6) are also fairly stable and signiﬁ-
cant for the two larger parties, suggesting that the average association
between constituency position and MP position is not driven by the
behavior of MPs from one particular party. In other words, when we
study the primary dimension of party competition in a party-dominated
system, we ﬁnd clear evidence of responsiveness to constituency opinion
above and beyond that associated with the party afﬁliations of MPs.
Figure 1 visually summarizes the regression model including party
and constituency opinion (3). The relatively tight clustering of MPs by
party along the Y-axis accords with the traditional view of British legisla-
tive politics that party is strongly associated with economic policy
positions. However, we note that because our hierarchical model smooths
MP positions toward their party mean, the degree of homogeneity within
parties may be overstated. MPs who sign few EDMs are located at the
center of their parties, rather than at the center of the dimension. This is
an estimation strategy optimized for within-party comparisons, rather
than across-party comparisons. Because MPs who sign few EDMs are
placed near the mean of their party, this may bias the regression estimate
of the within-party association with constituency opinion toward smaller
values than we would ﬁnd if MPs’ positions were known perfectly.
Study 2: Same-Sex Marriage
MP behavior. On February 5, 2013, the House of Commons vot-
ed on the second reading of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill. The
Bill had been introduced in the Commons a month earlier, at its ﬁrst
reading, but as is customary, the ﬁrst reading involved no debate and no
recorded vote. The second reading was therefore the ﬁrst opportunity for
Members of Parliament to debate the principles behind the Bill.
Because the Bill had not featured in the manifestos of any of the
main parties,9 and because it involves issues of conscience, the main
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political parties chose to make the vote a free vote—that is, one without
any party whip (House of Commons Library, Department of Information
Services 2013). There were 570 MPs who voted on the Bill; 395 voted
in favor, and ﬁve abstained. Despite the lack of a whip, MPs of different
parties voted very differently; 218 of 240 Labour MPs and 44 of 48
Liberal Democrat MPs voted in favor of the Bill, but only a minority
(126 of 266) of Conservative MPs did so.
Data on MPs votes came from publicwhip.org.uk, which parses
the ofﬁcial record of parliamentary debates, Hansard. We exclude MPs
who abstained and who did not vote.
Constituency preferences. We measure constituency opinion on
same-sex marriage by pooling data from several YouGov surveys on the
FIGURE 1
Constituency Left-Right Position against MP Left-Right Position
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Note: For all Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat MPs, this figure plots MP left-right posi-
tion against constituency left-right position. The dashed lines show, for each party, the estimated
regression line linking constituency and MP position and are based on model (3) in Table 1.
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issue. Respondents were asked “would you support or oppose changing
the law to allow same-sex couples to marry?” This question was asked
of 7,400 respondents to YouGov polls on several dates between Septem-
ber 2012 and August 2013. The original response format allowed
respondents to indicate whether they strongly supported, tended to sup-
port, tended to oppose, or strongly opposed this change. Strong support
and a tendency to support were combined to give a dichotomous variable
measuring support for same-sex marriage. Don’t knows were excluded
from the analysis.
The constituencies estimated to have highest support for same-sex
marriage—Bristol West, Hornsey and Wood Green, Islington North,
Brighton Pavillion—are all urban areas that tend to have either a high
number of young professionals or university students and employees.
There are no ﬁgures on the LGBT population ofWestminster constituen-
cies, which would allow us to assess the face validity of our measure
under the assumption that LGBT residents would be more in favor of
same-sex marriage. We note though that Brighton has been described as
Britain’s “gay capital” (Browne and Lim 2010, 619), and the surround-
ing local authority area hosted the second highest number of civil
partnership ceremonies (after Westminster but ahead of Islington).10 In
contrast, the seats that tend to have the lowest estimated support for
same-sex marriage—South Holland and the Deepings, Louth and
Horncastle, Christchurch, and Clacton—tend to be more rural, with
older, more religious populations.
Findings. Table 2 shows the results of six logistic regression
models of MP support for same-sex marriage. The ﬁrst three regressions
are again estimated for all MPs from the three main parties (Labour,
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats) who voted in the division, and model
the probability of voting in favor of the same-sex marriage bill as a func-
tion of (1) constituency support for same-sex marriage alone; (2) MP
party afﬁliation; and both party afﬁliation and constituency support for
same-sex marriage. The ﬁnal three regressions subset the MPs by party
afﬁliation and model MP voting as function of constituency opinion
alone.
The regression results indicate that, on the issue of same-sex mar-
riage, MPs are responsive to constituency opinion. In the models run on
all MPs, the coefﬁcient on constituency support for same-sex marriage is
positive and signiﬁcant whether or not party is controlled for (1 and 3).
The estimated coefﬁcient is also relatively stable when estimated sepa-
rately in each of the party subsamples, and is signiﬁcant for the
Conservative MPs at the 0.05 level and for Labour MPs at the 0.1 level.
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Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities deriving from the model
that includes both party and constituency opinion (3). The effect of con-
stituency opinion on the probability of voting for the bill is largest for
Conservative MPs, for whom a change from average constituency sup-
port for same-sex marriage (58.3% in support) to high support (63.5%)
results in a change in the predicted probability of supporting the measure
of approximately 10%. Because the baseline rates of support among
Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs are very high, the regression slopes
for Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs are shallower. Yet even for a
Labour MP, the same change in constituency support for same-sex mar-
riage results in a 3% increase in the predicted probability of voting for
same-sex marriage. Thus, on this policy issue, which is not strongly
FIGURE 2
Constituency Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage against Votes for
Same-Sex Marriage
Note: For all Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat MPs, this figure plots MP sup-
port for the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill (0 if the MP voted against the Bill, 1 if
the MP voted in favor) against estimated percentage support for same-sex marriage in the
MP’s constituency. The lines show, for each party, the predicted probability of the MP
supporting same-sex marriage as a function of constituency opinion, and are based on
model (3) in Table 2.
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related to the primary dimensions of party competition, we also ﬁnd evi-
dence of substantial within-party responsiveness to constituency
opinion.
Study 3: A “Free” Vote on Europe
MP behavior. On May 15, 2013, the Commons voted on an
amendment to its response to the Queen’s Speech (i.e, its response to the
government’s legislative agenda). The amendment, moved by Conserva-
tive Eurosceptic John Baron MP, would have expressed the House’s
respectful “regret that an EU referendum bill was not included in the
Gracious Speech.” Exceptionally, the Conservative Party allowed its
MPs a form of free vote on the amendment—while ministers would be
obliged to abstain, backbenchers were free to vote as they wished. Ordi-
narily, this would make it difﬁcult to discern abstentions from absences:
Although members may explicitly signal abstention by walking through
both the “aye” and “no” division doors, this practice is not obligatory.
Fortunately, however, the division on the EU referendum amendment
was immediately preceded by voting on the opposition response to the
Queen’s Speech, for which many Conservative MPs were present. We
therefore restrict our analysis to backbench Conservative MPs, and
assume that those MPs who were present for the previous vote, and who
did not vote in favor of the amendment, were against the amendment.
Although support for a referendum on an issue is not normally
equivalent to support for a particular outcome in that referendum, we
assume that among Conservative backbenchers support for a referendum
was a Eurosceptic position, signaling a wish to move towards exit or
reduce the powers of the EU over British affairs. This assumption is con-
sistent with studies of the politics of European policy within the
Conservative Party (Copsey and Haughton 2014; Giord 2014). Howev-
er, it does not hold across parties—the Liberal Democrats, for example,
have been in favor of a referendum on EU membership, but are the most
pro-European of the main parties.
Constituency preferences. For both this study and Study 4, we
measure constituency opinion on Europe based on information from
11,191 responses to a single question included in the BES 2010 CIPS.
The question was: “Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain’s
membership in the European Union?” The original response format
allowed respondents to indicate whether they strongly disapproved, dis-
approved, neither disapproved nor approved, approved, or strongly
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approved of membership. Strong disapproval and disapproval were com-
bined to give a dichotomous variable measuring EU disapproval.
The constituencies estimated to have the highest disapproval of
Britain’s EU membership—Clacton, North East Cambridgeshire,
Boston and Skegness, and South Holland and the Deepings—tend to
have populations that are older and have lower average educational
qualiﬁcations, whereas the constituencies estimated to be least disap-
proving—Bristol West, Hornsey and Wood Green, Hampstead and
Kilburn, and Islington North—tend to have younger, more educated,
and ethnically mixed populations. This accords with existing research on
the demographic correlates of support for anti-European parties such as
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (Ford and Goodwin
2014).
Findings. Table 3 shows the results of two logistic regression
models on support for an EU membership referendum among Conserva-
tive backbench MPs, expressed as a function of (1) an intercept alone,
and (2) constituency disapproval of British membership of the European
Union. If within-party responsiveness operates in this case, Conservative
MPs should be more likely to vote in favor of this referendum the more
Eurosceptic their constituency. This is indeed what we observe in (2),
where the coefﬁcient on constituency EU disapproval is positive and
signiﬁcant.
TABLE 3
Constituency Euroscepticism and Votes for an EU Referendum
among Conservative MPs
(1) (2)
Null Model Constituency Alone
(Intercept) 0.232† 23.088*
(0.140) (1.242)
Constituency EU disapproval 0.064**
(0.024)
Log-likelihood 2142.787 2138.804
Nagelkerke R-sq. 0.050
N 208 208
Note: All models are binary logistic regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if the
MP voted in favor of motion regretting the absence of an EU referendum bill in the Queen’s
Speech, and 0 otherwise. Model (1) includes all Conservative backbench MPs who either vot-
ed in this division or were present for the immediately preceding division. See the main text
for details of variable codings. † p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of a Conservative MP sup-
porting an EU membership referendum as a function of constituency EU
disapproval. The graph shows a relatively steep, ﬁtted regression curve,
with constituency opinion having a substantial association with MP
votes. For example, moving from the average level of disapproval in
constituencies held by Conservative backbenchers present that day
(51.6% disapproval) to a high level of disapproval (equal to the average
plus one standard deviation, or 58.4% disapproval), results in a change
in the predicted probability of an MP supporting an EU membership ref-
erendum of 10.6%. Thus, the magnitude of the association between
constituency opinion and MP position in this case is similar to that seen
in our discussion of the free vote on same-sex marriage.
FIGURE 3
Constituency EU Disapproval against Votes for EU Referendum
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Note: This figure plots Conservative backbencher support for a motion regretting the
absence of an EU referendum bill in the Queen’s Speech against percentage disapproval of
British membership of the EU in the MP’s constituency. The line shows the predicted prob-
ability of the MP supporting the motion as a function of constituency opinion, and is based
on model (2) in Table 3.
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Study 4: Backbench Rebellion on Europe
MP behavior. As an alternative measure of Conservative back-
benchers’ levels of Euroscepticsm, we use frequency of rebellion against
the party whip in Europe-related divisions during the 2010 parliament.
We focus on Conservative backbenchers because their rebellions over
Europe during this period are unambiguously Eurosceptic. In contrast,
the tendency of opposition MPs to vote strategically on whipped divi-
sions in Westminster systems (Spirling and McLean 2007) means that
the policy content of Labour MPs’ votes is unclear, while in the single
instance where a Liberal Democrat MP rebelled over Europe, he or she
did so taking an explicitly pro-European stance (Sanders, 2011).
To generate a list of all Europe-related divisions during the 2010
parliament, we began with the list of all divisions classiﬁed as relating to
Europe according to the publicwhip.org.uk “policy” classiﬁcation of
divisions.11 We supplemented this list of divisions with any further
Europe-related votes found by manually searching through the titles of
all divisions during the 2010 parliament on publicwhip.org.uk. Finally,
we cross-checked our list of Europe-related votes with Cowley and
Stuart’s (2012, 2013, 2014) lists of all Europe-related divisions where
any government MPs rebelled. In total, we observe 77 divisions (listed
in Appendix D of the supporting information) relating to Europe and on
which the Conservative Party whipped its MPs to vote in line with its
position. The average number of rebellions across Conservative
backbenchers is 3.95, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 40.
TABLE 4
Constituency Euroscepticism and Conservative Backbench
Rebellions on Europe
(1) (2)
Null Model Constituency Alone
(Intercept) 22.680*** 26.581***
(0.154) (1.572)
Constituency opinion 0.074*
(0.029)
Deviance 2215.749 2094.321
N 188 188
Note: All models are overdispersed binomial logistic regressions where the dependent
variable is the number of rebellions on Europe-related divisions. Model (1) includes all Con-
servative backbench MPs. See the main text for details of variable codings. † p<0.1;
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Constituency preferences. The measures of constituency opin-
ion used in this study are the same as those used in Study 3.
Findings. Table 4 shows the results of two overdispersed binomi-
al logistic regressions of the number of rebellions by Conservative
backbench MPs on Europe-related divisions, expressed as a function of
(1) an intercept alone, and (2) constituency disapproval of British mem-
bership in the European Union. If within-party responsiveness operates
in this case, Conservative MPs should rebel more frequently on Europe
the more Eurosceptic their constituency. We indeed observe a positive
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on constituency EU disapproval.
Figure 4 plots the predicted proportion of times a Conservative
backbench MP rebels on Europe as a function of constituency EU
FIGURE 4
Constituency EU Disapproval against Conservative Backbencher
Rebellions
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Note: This figure plots the relative frequency of Conservative backbench MP rebellions in
Europe against percentage disapproval of British membership in the EU in the MP’s constituen-
cy. The line shows the predicted proportion of times an MP rebels in Europe as a function of
of constituency opinion, and is based on model (2) in Table 4.
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disapproval. It shows that constituency opinion has a substantial associa-
tion with rebellions. Moving from the average level of disapproval in
constituencies held by Conservative backbenchers (51.6% disapproval)
to a high level of disapproval (equal to the average plus one standard
deviation, or 58.1% disapproval) results in a 3.3% increase in the pre-
dicted proportion of times a Conservative backbencher rebels on
Europe. Thus, we also ﬁnd evidence of within-party responsiveness to
constituency opinion on whipped votes, which are far more frequent
than free votes in the House of Commons.
Conclusions
In this article, we have demonstrated that in the United Kingdom,
MPs are individually policy responsive to their constituencies across a
variety of issues. Across three policy domains, there is a within-party
association between the policy positions of individual MPs and policy
opinion in their respective constituencies. To demonstrate this, we used
small-area estimation techniques to generate estimates of constituency
opinion from large national samples. We then linked these constituency
opinion estimates to observed MP policy positions as revealed by Early
Day Motion signatures, unwhipped votes, and whipped votes in the
House of Commons. The substantive size of the association between
constituency opinion and MP positions was weak compared to the effect
of party, but it was not negligible.
We expect that our ﬁndings should generalize to other issues in
British politics. We have studied one issue that is central to the primary
dimension of party competition (left-and right-wing economic posi-
tions); one issue (attitudes towards the European Union) which for most
of the last 40 years has been orthogonal to the primary dimension of par-
ty competition; and one issue that has been neglected by party
competition (attitudes towards same-sex marriage). We have found evi-
dence of within-party dyadic representation across all of these issues.
Additionally, we have shown that within one particular area, European
Union policy, dyadic representation is seen in both unwhipped and
whipped votes. Thus, our key ﬁndings do not appear to depend on the
nature of the issues chosen for free votes.
We see these ﬁndings as an important contribution to the literature
on dyadic representation, and an improvement on previous dyadic repre-
sentation research in Westminster systems, which has, without
exception, had to resort to proxies of constituency opinion to study poli-
cy responsiveness. Our results also speak to broader concerns about
trade-offs between constituency responsiveness and representation
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through responsible programmatic parties, something that many (includ-
ing most American commentators: see Epstein 1980; Kirkpatrick 1971,
967) have viewed as a deﬁning characteristic of British politics. In this
article, we have examined cases of overt disagreement within parties,
since it is in these cases that we can observe within-party variation in
behavior. The more overt disagreement there is within parties, the less
parties can claim to be responsible in the sense provided by Katz and
Wildenmann (1987, 7). But it would be a mistake to equate within-party
policy responsiveness only with overt disagreement. What we have dem-
onstrated in this study is that when MPs have opportunities to express
distinct political positions from their copartisans, they do so in ways that
reﬂect within-party variation in the constituents’ preferences. This does
not guarantee that within-party policy responsiveness carries over to the
many within-party differences of opinion that are resolved privately.
Nonetheless, it clearly makes more plausible the notion that, in West-
minster systems, constituency opinion may have a broader unseen role
in shaping party policy programes than has generally been appreciated.
This is particularly the case when one couples our evidence that MPs
appear to be individually responsive to constituency policy opinion
with recent evidence that backbench MPs in turn have considerable
policy-relevant inﬂuence upon party leaders (Kam et al. 2010).
Going forward, we can see a number of directions for future
research on dyadic representation in Westminster systems. The ﬁrst, and
most obvious, suggestion is that future research should attempt to identi-
fy the mechanisms that generate responsiveness. Although an
exhaustive empirical evaluation of potential mechanisms is beyond the
scope of this article—which is primarily concerned with establishing the
existence of within-party policy responsiveness in a Westminster sys-
tem—we have conducted some exploratory tests of whether
responsiveness varies according to a number of observable attributes:
the method by which MPs were originally selected as candidates; MPs’
biographical links to the constituency; constituency marginality; and
whether or not the MP stood down at the 2015 general election. These
tests, reported in Appendix E of the supporting information, yield no
strong evidence in favor of ex ante selection mechanisms, nor ex post
sanctioning mechanisms.
This does not mean that we should deﬁnitively rule out either of
these causal mechanisms, since our power to detect interactions with the
current data is low (the number of observations used to estimate each
interaction lies between 188 and 556) and the attributes we have been
able to measure only imperfectly proxy the selection or sanctioning
mechanisms of theoretical interest. Yet it may also be that the strength of
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constituency responsiveness can best be explained by pointing to other
mechanisms, such as MPs’ conception of their role. Although the roles
backbench MPs adopt are inﬂuenced by electoral considerations, they
are not constrained or determined by them (Searing 1994).
Our second suggestion is that future research should ascertain
whether MPs accurately perceive constituency opinion. In the original
formulation of Miller and Stokes (1963), the “constituency inﬂuence”
over legislator policy positions was a product of several intermediate
links. The link between constituency opinion and legislators’ perceptions
of those opinions was one such link. If legislators are poor judges of opin-
ion in their constituencies, any association between constituency opinion
and MP behavior cannot result fromMPs’ conscious efforts to respond to
their constituents’ views. Instead, it might result from constituencies
choosing representatives whose sincerely held preferences are close to
their own.We would therefore encourage academics carrying out surveys
of MPs or of parliamentary candidates to ask respondents to estimate con-
stituency opinion on a variety of issues. Despite likely low response rates,
such survey measures could still usefully be combined with constituency
opinion estimates to characterize the gap between what MPs think their
constituents think, and what their constituents actually think.
Third, we recommend that researchers enlarge the set of countries
studied. We think there is great potential for techniques of small-area
estimation to be applied to issues in Australian and Canadian politics.
The smaller number of constituencies makes small-area estimation easi-
er, since the number of respondents per constituency will be higher for
any given sample size. Future progress in this area is likely to be limited
by funding for the large national samples required.
Our fourth recommendation is to enlarge the set of individuals
studied. Two useful comparisons might be made. One comparison is
between parliamentary candidates who were narrowly elected (and who
therefore became MPs), and parliamentary candidates who were narrow-
ly defeated. As we have noted, surveys of sitting MPs typically suffer
from low response rates. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, of cam-
paign period surveys of candidates. There may be some use in
constructing a panel of defeated candidates, who presumably would be
unaffected by sanctioning effects.
A further useful comparison is between lower and upper chambers.
Both Canada and the United Kingdom feature upper chambers whose
members are (in large part) appointed. But these members often have
observable links to particular constituencies or areas, either because they
were formerly MPs for a named constituency or because they were
appointed as representatives of a particular area. If former MPs in such
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bodies could be shown to be responsive to opinion in their former con-
stituencies, this would again make it less plausible that responsiveness
emerges from retention and sanctioning rather than initial selection.
As the examples of the House of Lords and the Canadian Senate
suggest, institutional reforms may provide researchers with further win-
dows on dyadic representation. We expect that researchers will be
attuned to exogenous institutional changes that might affect either the
way in which MPs are selected or the way in which they are retained.
Institutional changes may take a long time to emerge. In this they
are similar to private records of the positions MPs have taken in internal
party meetings (e.g., meetings of the Conservative backbench 1922
Committee, or of the Parliamentary Labour Party) and in cabinet com-
mittees, which may only emerge in bowdlerized form long after the
events they describe. Due to a paucity of large survey samples, it is difﬁ-
cult to estimate constituency opinion in the past and to then match this to
archival records of MP positions. However, current estimates of constit-
uency opinion may have a second life in explaining archival notes of
internal party dissent.
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1. In its fullest sense, dyadic representation requires that legislator policy posi-
tions are “close” to or “congruent” with constituency policy positions (Achen 1978).
Evaluating congruence requires measurement of constituency and legislator policy posi-
tions on the same scale, which is often infeasible (although see Bafumi and Herron 2010;
Hug and Martin 2011; Masket and Noel 2012). However, even if legislator and constitu-
ency policy positions are measured on nonequivalent scales, it is possible to empirically
test whether legislator positions are “responsive” to constituency opinion in an associa-
tional or correlational sense—whether, for example, legislators from more right-wing
constituencies adopt more right-wing policy positions. The existence of such responsive-
ness—which Converse and Pierce (1986, 563) refer to as a “basic representation
bond”—is a necessary, though not sufﬁcient, condition for dyadic representation. Such
an association need not imply high-quality representation in the sense of closeness, as
legislators might systematically be more inclined towards one position regardless of their
constituents’ opinions (Matsusaka 2001), but it does nonetheless imply some relationship
between public opinion in a constituency and the behavior of the legislator. It is this
notion of responsiveness upon which we focus in this article.
2. The inﬂuence of this line of argument is exempliﬁed by the ofﬁcial remit giv-
en to the Jenkins (1998) report on electoral reform in the United Kingdom, which
explicitly stated that any new electoral system should maintain a link between MPs and
geographic constituencies. The other main argument put forward against electoral reform
is that SMD elections produce clear majorities and therefore greater accountability
(Carey and Hix 2011).
3. Lax and Phillips (2013) ﬁnd that, when using MRP to estimate opinion in US
states, including more than a small number of state-level predictors leads to overﬁtting.
However, in the current context the number of areal units for which we are trying to esti-
mate opinion is much larger—632 Westminster constituencies versus 50 US states—
which means we effectively have more “observations” for our area- level regressions.
Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan (2016) provide validation evidence showing that
MRP models using a similar set of constituency-level predictors to that used here per-
form well in the UK context.
4. We include 2010 vote shares as constituency-level predictors because we
believe that these variables provide useful observable information about the political dis-
position of constituencies. We also generated alternative constituency opinion estimates
dropping vote shares as constituency-level predictors. Using these alternative constituen-
cy opinion estimates does not change our substantive ﬁndings: in each case, constituency
opinion estimated without 2010 vote shares is still signiﬁcantly and positively associated
with MP position.
5. As Cowley and Stuart (2014, 6) observe, “there is always a summit, a treaty
amendment, a budget” forcing Europe back on to the parliamentary agenda.
6. Description found on the Parliament website: http://www.parliament.uk/edm.
7. We excluded these because they did not seem to have any policy content. Ear-
ly DayMotion 40 gives a ﬂavor of the kind of geographically speciﬁc issues:
That this House congratulates Blackpool Football Club on its inspirational achievement
of promotion to the Premier League following victory in the Wembley play-off final;
pays tribute to the transformational leadership of Ian Holloway and the contribution of
all the management, directors and staff at the club towards the tremendous achievement
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of the club’s players in returning Blackpool FC to the highest pinnacle of English foot-
ball after 39 years; praises Blackpool FC for its consistent achievement working with
its community trust schools, health and other programmes to be at the centre of Black-
pool’s aspirations and regeneration plans; and applauds the way that commitment to
the town was reciprocated by the tens of thousands who turned out to welcome the
team in its triumphal return along Blackpool’s Promenade and Golden Mile.
We are sure that the 16 MPs who signed this motion were representing the Blackpool
fans amongst their constituents, but we doubt this act had anything to do with dyadic rep-
resentation policy responsiveness as we understand it.
8. One potential concern with these results is that our estimates of constituency
opinion are subject to uncertainty, and that we are not accounting for this uncertainty
when we simply include the posterior mean of constituency opinion as a predictor in an
OLS regression. To assess whether this leads to misleading inferences, we also estimated
a Bayesian MCMC model that incorporates uncertainty about constituency opinion in a
principled manner. Speciﬁcally, we model MP behavior as a function of both MP party
and “true” constituency opinion, with our “observed” point estimates of constituency
opinion simultaneously modeled as a noisy manifestation of “true” constituency opinion
(i.e., our vector of constituency opinion estimates is a draw from a multivariate normal
distribution with mean vector equal to true constituency opinion and variance-covariance
matrix estimated based on the MCMC sample generated from the MRP estimation pro-
cess). This approach yields very similar estimates to those reported in Table 1, with
substantive conclusions unchanged.
9. Only the Conservatives mentioned same-sex relationships, and only in the
context of recognizing civil partnership within the tax system (p. 52).
10. Civil partnerships were introduced in 2004 across Great Britain to provide a
form of legally recognized union between same-sex couples. Statistics on civil partner-
ships by area are made available by the Ofﬁce of National Statistics (“Civil Partnership
Formations,” available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birth-
sdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabitationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/civilpart-
nershipstatisticsunitedkingdomcivilpartnershipformations), but the ﬁgures are
reported at local authority area only for England and Wales. When we map our
constituency estimates on to local authority areas in proportion to area, we ﬁnd a
strong positive correlation (r5 0.58, N5 147) between the number of civil part-
nerships formed over the period 2008 to 2013 and our estimates of opinion on
same-sex marriage.
11. See http://publicwhip.org.uk/policies.php. We selected any divisions classi-
ﬁed under “European Union—For” or under “Referendum on UK’s membership of the
EU—For.”
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